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Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and 
Social Policy Developments*
Hong, Kyung Zoon**
This paper tries to provide empirical support for a formal model of social policy development, 
as presented in a former paper on this study. In a direct democracy, the median voter’s social 
policy preference is critical because he is a Condorcet winner in pair-wise pure majority 
voting. However, in a more general setting, we should think of various political institutions 
as a collective choice of device. For this reason, I draw a formal model that formulates 
three contrasting types of political institutions that are distinguished by the developments 
of political democracy and the differences in electoral rules. Comparative patterns of 
key variables that measure political institutions, social policy developments, and social 
policy preferences provide support for arguments. My empirical results suggest that three 
political institutions are associated with very different policy outcomes. Compared to other 
institutions, a committee system entails more targeted subsidies and a less universal benefit. 
In contrast, proportional elections produce a more universal benefit and fewer targeted 
subsidies.
Keywords: Social Policy Preferences, Social Policy Developments, Political Institutions, 
Democracy, Electoral Rule, Korea
I. IntroductIon
This paper attempts to analyze at an empirical level the social policy preferences1 
* translated from an article published in the Korean Journal of Social Welfare 62(3): 
141-162, 2010 with permission from the Korean Academy of Social Welfare.
** Professor, department of Social Welfare, Sungkyunkwan university
1 there are a number of terms similarly applied, such as public opinion, beliefs, 
attitudes, awareness, and others; however, in the area of social policy, these are 
used together with no major distinction. In this paper, I use the term “social policy 
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held by members of society and the effects of the basic political system 
collectively determining such preferences on the development of social policy. 
Social policy is a concept that encompasses policies in a variety of domains, 
but here it is defined as a system that takes income from the market and 
redistributes it through national policy, thus creating public income transfers. 
typical public income transfer systems are income security systems that 
include social benefits and, of course, social insurance and public assistance. 
Income security systems distribute taxes (or contributions) collected from 
members of a society according to a particular standard. Members of society 
who can increase their utility through such a system prefer the development 
of an income security system (that is, as social policy), whereas members 
of society who experience a decrease in utility would not prefer such a 
development. of course, it can be said that the difference in social policy 
preference is linked to individual characteristics (e.g., such as socioeconomic 
status, position within the labor market, age, and risk aversion tendencies). 
It has been noted that if a society’s social policy preferences can be expressed 
as a monotonic function of its members individual characteristics, then 
collective decisions from the principle of majority rule are possible, and their 
preferences have a single crossing property (Gans and Smart 1996). Also, in 
such a case, the result of collective decision coincides with the preference of 
the voter with the median characteristic.
However, although it has been stated that preference aggregation by pure 
majority rule is possible, the results of the social policy also depend on the 
institutions that govern how the preference aggregations are made. Bearing 
in mind the democratic political structure that is founded on collective 
decision-making according to voter preferences, it is clear that this can have 
a direct and powerful impact on development and changes of social policy. 
However, political systems based on collective decisions are truly diverse. 
Therefore, to discuss the relationship between voters’ social policy preferences 
and social policy development, a theoretical discussion of the effects of 
the concrete institutional form of collective decision-making is necessary. 
This paper aims to verify empirically the theoretical model of former study, 
which states that diversity of welfare regime or difference in social policy 
preference” to refer to people’s awareness or attitudes of social policy.
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development are related to differences in the mechanisms for converting 
voters’ social policy preferences to collective decision-making.2 Because the 
main goal of this paper is based on an empirical study, it will give the briefest 
possible introduction to the aforementioned theoretical model and will base 
its argument on an empirical analysis that utilizes a variety of evidences.
II. tHeoretIcAl Model
In a preceding article related to this paper, a formal model concerning social 
policy preferences, political systems, and the development of social policy 
was proposed. The following will serve as a brief introduction to this model.3
1. Asset Model of Social Policy Preferences and its Limitations
the asset model of social policy preferences (Iversen and Soskice, 2001) 
emphasizes the points where the skill constraints4 involved in a particular 
production system have an effect on voters’ social policy preferences. let 
α equal the proportion of people employed by businesses that use both 
general skills and specific skills, and let s ∙ g5 equal those workers’ hourly 
wages. Furthermore, let β equal the proportion of people employed by 
businesses that use only general skills, let g equal these worker’s hourly 
wages, and suppose that the social policy allowance R is allocated by means 
of a proportional income tax t (on market income). If the proportion of 
2 this paper is the second part of a two-part paper. the first paper was published as 
“explaining the development of Social Policy; social policy preferences and political 
institutions” in the Korean Journal of Social Welfare 61(4): 35-39. Here, the focus is on 
points explicated in that paper’s theoretical model. This paper focuses on empirically 
verifying the theoretical model derived in the prior paper. therefore, for a more 
detailed look at the theoretical model, please refer to the respective paper.
3 The following description of the theoretical model refers to Hong (2009).
4 The degree to which a given skill is valued only at specific indusrties or companies is 
referred to as “skill specificity.” Specific skills are those that are valued only at specific 
industries or companies, whereas general skills are those that are valued at a variety of 
businesses and companies.
5 Therefore, in cases without specific skills (s = 1), the wage rate is g.
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unemployed workers γ = 1 – (α + β), and l(t)6 and w¯ are the labor supply (or 
hours applied to labor) and the average wage rate, respectively, then voters’ 
income before taxes, according to their employment and skill status, can be 
expressed as follows:
Specific Skills Group: CS = (1 – t) ∙ l(t) ∙ sg + R = (1 – 2R/w¯) ∙ sg + R
General Skills Group: CG = (1 – t) ∙ l(t) ∙ g + R = (1 – 2R/w¯) ∙ g + R
unemployed Group: CU = R (1)
Here, α, β, and γ represent the probability that voters will belong to their 
respective groups; hence, they consider each of the three cases and attempt 
to maximize their own expected utility. If the discounting of future income 
is not taken into account, then the expected utility can be expressed as V = α 
∙ u(CS) + β ∙ u(CG) + γ ∙ u(CU). If the expected wage rate y = α ∙ sg + β ∙ g and 
this value is fixed and if the change in R is evaluated according to the increase 
in s, then the following holds:
When rrA (relative risk aversion) > 0, δR/δs > 0
Finally, if we assume that the expected wage rate is fixed and if voters’ risk 
aversion tendency is greater than zero, then the increase in s, that is, the 
increase in the proportion of specific skills with respect to general skills, 
causes an increase in social policy allowance r. More intuitively, this model 
can be organized as follows. First, because the skill specificity and their 
transferability in the labor market usually have an inverse relationship, 
members of a society with specific skills may potentially experience longer 
periods of unemployment or serious drops in income due to unemployment. 
Second, as a result, members of a society with specific skills have more 
motivation than those with general skills to avoid such risks. In other words, 
a greater the degree of specificity in skills leads to a greater inclination toward 
risk aversion. third, social policy is a powerful mean for dispersing the 
risks of unemployment and the drops in income that can occur in the labor 
market. Fourth, as a result, voters with a high degree of skill specificity have a 
6 Accounting for the decreasing effect of taxation on the labor supply, l(t) = 1/(1 + t).
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greater preference for social policy.
Based on the asset model of social policy preferences, production regime 
and welfare regime are complementary because voter preferences, shaped 
in the institutional constraint of the production regime, form the welfare 
regime. For example, coordinated market economies (cMes) had fostered a 
production regime which depends on the incremental innovation according 
to comparative advantages, the specific skills set of an average worker is 
one condition that makes incremental innovation possible. therefore, the 
proportion of voters with a specific skill among all voters is high in cMes. 
Finally, due to their preferences, the level of development of social policy 
in cMes is high. This model has the advantage of being able to explain the 
complementarity between production regime and welfare regime by means of 
a voters’ policy preferences established by their skill specificity.
However, the point that is overlooked in this type of theoretical model is 
that some countries classified as cMes—particularly Japan and South Korea, 
which are the focus of this paper—do not have a higher level of social policy 
development than countries with liberal market economies (lMes). examples 
such as Japan and South Korea7 show that even if voters prefer an apparatus 
that disperses the risk of unemployment or income losses in the labor market, 
actual social policy development may not occur. If this is the case, then are 
these examples exceptions beyond the range of application of a universal 
theory? Should they be regarded as special cases? the answer to both 
questions is no. The limits of an asset model of social policy preferences are 
related to the fact that research on social policy or welfare states has generally 
been based on some advanced capitalist countries of the West, which easily 
satisfy the conditions of a democratic political system and as a result operate 
on the basis of collective decision-making according to voter preferences. 
Thus, to discuss the relationship between voters’ social policy preferences and 
the actual level of social policy development at a general level, an additional 
7 Hall and Soskice (2001: 34), with the leading theory of institutional complementarities, 
divide cMes into those adjusted at the industry level and those adjusted at the 
business level, placing South Korea and Japan in the latter category. Amable (2003: 
107) also explains that capitalist Asian countries such as South Korea and Japan are 
just as reliant on specific skills as capitalist countries from continental europe and 
countries with social-democratic economies.
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theoretical discussion of the effects that the concrete institutional form of 
collective decision-making has on social policy decisions is necessary.
2. Political Systems Based on Collective Decision-Making
Based on common sense, it is clear that not all societies are based on 
collective decision-making according to voter preferences. Voter preferences 
are easily ignored in societies ruled by dictators. even in the case of societies 
with democratic political systems, depending on the institutional form of the 
collective decision-making process, voter preferences are reflected in different 
degrees in the determination of actual resulting policy. There are a variety of 
ways to differentiate political systems, which have an effect on collective social 
policy decisions, but this paper divides them into three types according to the 
degree of the development of democratic politics and the characteristics of 
electoral rule.8 First, there are cases in which the development of democratic 
politics lags behind. In such societies, the decisions regarding social policy 
are entrusted to special groups or actors with the authority to make policy 
decisions. these policy decision-makers can be dictators, or they can be 
leaders of democratic system administrations or bureaucrats that formally 
claim to support democracy but are in reality deficient. In this paper, 
such political systems which are relatively behind in the development of 
democratic political systems are called committee systems. on the other 
hand, even in cases in which democratic political systems are developed, 
there are a variety of ways to gather preferences. In a proportional election 
system, the number of seats given to a given political party is based on the 
proportion of voters supporting that party among all voters, whereas in a 
majoritarian election system, this is determined based on the proportion of 
electoral districts supporting the party among all electoral districts.
let all members of society, with income levels all set to a level of 1, belong 
to one of the three groups (J = 1, 2, 3), and let the size of each group be set to 
1. Additionally, suppose that voters belonging to each of the three groups all 
have the same policy preferences. on the other hand, suppose that policy is 
multi-dimensional. In other words, in this society, there are not only income 
8 This theoretical model is a reconfiguration of Persson and tabellini (1998).
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security allowances given universally to all groups as public goods, but also 
subsidies given exclusively to each group.9 If a tax (t) appropriated for this 
policy is imposed equally on all groups, the budget constraint condition 
can then be expressed as 3t = ΣJ = 1, 2, 3 g
J + R10 and the policy preferences of 
members of group J can be expressed as follows:
wJ = U(cJ) + V(gJ) + H(R)      s.t. 3t = ΣJ = 1, 2, 3 g
J + R (2)
Here, U( ∙ ), V( ∙ ), H( ∙ ) are all concave functions, assuming that they 
are normal utility functions, and cJ represents individual consumption of 
voters belonging to group J, gJ represents subsidies given exclusively to each 
group, and r represents universal income security allowances having the 
characteristics of public goods.
now let’s compare the size of the vectors of the policy determined 
collectively in the three different political systems: committee systems, 
proportional election systems, and majoritarian election systems.11 First, 
assuming no distortion effect of taxation, taxes are collected on all income-
receiving members of society in all three political systems. In other words, tc 
= tp = tm.12 The next step is a comparison of the size of the subsidies returned 
to each group and the universal income security allowances returned to 
all groups. In order to do this, some assumptions about the preferences of 
policy decision-makers are necessary. First, there is the assumption that 
takes into account developmental welfare regime, for which, in a committee 
system, policy decision-makers are authority figures with developmental 
goals; in group 2 (J = 2), they are placed in the industry sector, which receives 
governmental support; and subsidies given to group 2 are paid as “contingent 
9 this assumption reflects the reality that shadow welfare state programs such as 
subsidies, tax expenditures, and rents clearly exist in addition to social policies such as 
income security systems. Particularly in the case of countries such as South Korea and 
Japan, the proportion of such programs is relatively large. See Hong (2008).
10 In order to avoid complicating the analysis, distortion effects from taxation, such as a 
decrease in the labor supply, are ignored.
11 For more detail, see Hong (2009).
12 The policy vector is attached to the case of the committee system as superscript c, the 
proportional system as p, and the majoritarian system as m.
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rent” for the purpose of industrial development (Hong 2008). therefore, 
the objective function of policy decision-makers in a committee system can 
be expressed as that which provides the maximum contingent rent to the 
one possible group, group 2. of course, here, the size of the contingent rent 
given to group 2 depends on the scope of the authority possessed by the 
policy decision-makers. If the policy decision-maker is a dictator who has 
monopolized all policy decision-making authority, then the situation can be 
depicted as an extreme type of developmental welfare regime in which not 
only universal income security payments, but also subsidies for groups 1 
and 3 are completely nonexistent, that is, all available resources are utilized 
as contingent rent for the purpose of economic development. on the other 
hand, if we apply the condition of requiring majority consent in a committee 
for policy decisions, then a fixed amount of subsidies will be paid to group 1 
or group 3 or even weaker groups.13
the case of proportional election systems and majoritarian election 
systems applies to most democratic systems; therefore, the political party 
that wins an election becomes the policy decision-maker. In this type of 
political system, political parties promise policies that reflect the preferences 
of voters, and voters give their support to the political party, putting forth 
policies that maximize their own utility functions. therefore, the objective 
function of policy decision-makers is to maximize the probability of winning 
an election. However, the policies that competing political parties propose in 
order to increase the probability of winning an election cannot help but differ 
between proportional election systems and majoritarian election systems. The 
way a political party maximizes its probability of winning in a proportional 
election system is not only to offer universal income security allowances to 
all members of society but also to pay additional subsidies to groups with 
the greatest homogeneity of attitudes as well as to those with the most swing 
voters. This also occurs in majoritarian election systems, but it differs in that 
such subsidies are concentrated in electoral districts with many swing voters 
rather than on all swing voters. In other words, because the marginal utility 
of subsidies evaluated by political parties in majoritarian election systems is 
13 This is because, since policy decision-makers benefit from the lower cost of building a 
winning coalition, members representing weaker groups are drawn into alliances. 
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greater than the marginal utility of subsidies evaluated by political parties in 
proportional election systems, the size of subsidies directed at special groups 
is larger in majoritarian election systems. As a result, subsidies returned to 
special groups adhere to gc > gm > gp, and universal allowances returned to all 
groups adhere to Rc < Rm < Rp.
The above model shows that even if the preferences of members of society 
are identical, the level of development of social policy differs according to the 
political institution on which collective decisions are based. In other words, 
when other conditions are equal, social policy develops the least in committee 
systems—political systems with a relatively low development of democracy—
while in the case of democratic political systems, social policy develops more 
in proportional election systems than in majoritarian election systems.
III.  SocIAl PolIcy PreFerenceS, PolItIcAl InStItu-
tIonS, And tHe coMPArAtIVe ASPectS oF SocIAl 
PolIcy deVeloPMent
1.  Skill Specificity, Social Policy Preference, and the Comparative 
Aspects of Social Policy Development
Is social policy more developed in societies in which members have a strong 
preference for social policy? It is appropriate to study the relationship 
between these two variables from a comparative perspective that allows 
controlling of multiple factors. A multi-variable analysis in which the 
independent variable is a social policy preference or the skill specificity that 
affects it and where the dependent variable is the level of development of 
social policy would be useful as a study of the empirical relationship between 
social policy preference and social policy development. However, it is not 
easy to procure the data required for this type of analysis. First, it is not easy 
to synthesize social policy preferences or skill specificity measured at the 
individual level into the national or macro-level. Analytical methods exist for 
solving various associated problems, including the difference in measurement 
levels, but in order to apply such analytical methods, a sample size large 
enough for multi-variable analysis must be procured. The problem is that in 
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this paper, measurements of the variables of social policy preference and skill 
specificity were collected in 2006, whereas measurements of the measurable 
variables of social policy development in the relevant countries were most 
recently collected in 2005. Including South Korea and Japan, which are the 
targets of this research, it is difficult in reality to procure data that satisfies 
time precedence, one of the conditions for establishing a causal relationship. 
due to this limitation, several proxy variables that measure skill specificity, 
preferences of social policy, political system, and social policy development 
are introduced below, and the method of studying the patterns of co-variation 
observed between these proxy variables is used.
the best means of measuring skill specificity is to look for elasticity of 
substitution between skills represented on a production possibility curve. 
However, because it is extremely difficult to observe such elasticity of 
substitution empirically, there is no choice but to use a variety of proxy 
variables. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) surveyed and compared some of 
the most common measures of skill specificity applied in previous empirical 
researches: 1) job training, 2) job change and tenure, 3) the degree of inter-
industry labor mobility, 4) wage differentials, and 5) the occupational 
classification (Iversen-Soskice Index). this paper uses the occupational 
classification index because this index is designed to allow the direct 
measurement of skill specificity from micro data at the individual level.
the occupational classification index proposed by Iversen and Soskice 
(2001) was created with the aim of hierarchically structuralizing the Ilo’s job 
classification index, ISco-88’s two concepts of “skill” and “job.” In ISco-88, 
skills are categorized according to the level and degree of skill specialization. 
All of the jobs listed in ISco-88 are divided first into ten job categories 
(level-one classifications) according to four skill levels. next, these ten job 
categories are hierarchically divided into 28 middle classifications (level-two 
classifications), 116 sub-categories (level-three classifications), and finally 390 
sub-sub-categories (level-four classifications), a process in which the degree 
of skill specialization is utilized. the index of skill specificity goes through 
this type of process and the jobs in the 390 sub-sub-categories are assumed to 
be homogenous in terms of skill. As a result, within the largest classification 
of job categories, the proportion comprised of a sub-sub-category can act 
as a proxy for that job’s skill specificity. For example, the sub-sub-category 
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jobs included in “Plant and Machine operators and assemblers” (level-one 
classification number 8) with 70 entries comprise about 17.95% of the total 
jobs in the sub-sub-category, but the sub-sub-category jobs included in 
“clerks” (level-one classification number 3) with 23 entries comprise about 
5.90% of the total jobs in the sub-sub-category. Therefore, the skill specificity 
of “Plant and Machine operators and assemblers” is greater than that of 
“clerks.” one point to note here is the number of people who work in a 
given job, as ISco-88 suggests a greater variety of sub-sub-categories in job 
categories with a large number of people working in them. For example, sub-
sub-category jobs included in “specialists” (level-one classification number 
2) comprise about 14.10% of all of the sub-sub-category jobs. this can be 
considered quite high in terms of skill specificity; however, this situation 
arises because the number of people working in the “specialists” category is 
large. to offset this type of scaling effect on the index of skill specificity, an 
inverse weighting is given according to how many people belong to a given 
job category. If the aim is to be able to measure the degree of skill specificity 
using the same method applied to sub-categories, then the degree of skill 
specificity can either be represented as these two measurements or as the 
average value of these two measurements. However, it is important to note 
that in the theoretical model we examined earlier, we defined skill specificity 
not as the absolute value of specific skills s but as the relative value of specific 
skills compared to general skills, s/g. Therefore, we can produce final measure 
of skill specificity which is based on dividing this index by proxy variables 
that measure general skills, that is, ISco measure of the level of skills. This 
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number of sub-category jobs belonging to the broad job categorysub-category specificity=
number of jobs in the sub-category
total size of workforce
size of workforce in broad job category
 
number of sub-sub-category jobs belonging to the broad job categorysub-sub-category specificity=
number of jobs in the sub-sub-category
total size of workforce
size of workforce in broad job category
×
on the other hand, according to Kim (2009), who critically reviewed previous 
researches on the social policy preferences, the preceding researches largely 
approached two methods with respect to the measurement of social policy 
preference. First, there is the general approach of looking at the degree of 
respondents’ social policy preferences by means of their preferences for social 
justice or equality or by means of the degree of government responsibility for 
social policy in general and understanding this through the method of using 
a single index or multiple indices in a simple aggregate. The other approach 
is a more program-specific approach of understanding individual members 
of society’s preferences toward each specific social policy program, such as 
medical, education, pension, unemployment benefits, and others. Kim (2009) 
emphasizes the fact that when one examines these critically, measurements 
of social policy preference exist on the basis of the multidimensionality of 
social policy arising from the target of the preference. If social policies can 
be divided into those that target the workforce and those that target the non-
workforce and if it is more useful to discern the changes and developments 
of the social policy than preceding approaches, then social policy preferences 
targeting the workforce and those targeting the non-workforce should also 
be distinguished. This suggestion is appropriate with respect to this paper’s 
theoretical model of social policy preferences and skill specificity. In the 
theoretical model suggested above, members of the society are assumed to 
have the ability to work and are assumed to receive social policy allowances 
universally regardless of employment or skill status. In other words, target of 
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the social policy preference in this study is the workforce.
It is not easy to find quantitative data set which contains social policy 
preferences from a comparative perspective. Moreover, data related to social 
policy preferences must ask questions of the same form to all societies 
chosen for comparison. This is because one cannot be sure of the reliability 
of measurements in cases where, a small difference in the content of the 
questions exists. the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) has 
an advantage on this point; it has devoted much effort ensuring that the 
questions about social policy preferences as used in this study have exactly the 
same meaning in all of the countries. Moreover, this data offers individual-
level measure on skill specificity. the social policy preferences in the ISSP 
data were surveyed a total of four times from the 1985 study to the present, 
but this paper will utilize the data from 2006, which includes South Korea as 
a survey population.14 The social policy preferences in the ISSP data consisted 
of a variety of questions, but this paper has chosen the six questions shown in 
table 1 as the questions that ask about the social policy preferences targeted 
at the workforce.
on the other hand, table 2 shows the ratio of public social expenditure to 
GdP  in the 16 oecd countries. This measure is the proxy of the degree of 
social policy developments. The value shown is the average value from 2001 
to 2005. As one may well know, the organization for economic cooperation 
14 this considers the point that the index of skill specificity explained above and the 
survey data can be used and found.
Table 1. Survey Items for the ISSP Social Policy Preference data
Preference 
target Survey Item Value
Workforce Financial supply for job creation projects
Government spending on unemployment benefits
Providing a job for everyone who wants one
Support for unemployed people to live an appropriate lifestyle
Government spending on healthcare







Source: ISSP. 2010. International Social Survey Programme. 2006.
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and development (oecd) totals the size of spending on social policy 
programs disbursed through government and private funds, terming it “social 
expenditure.” the social expenditure in this data are categorized into nine 
areas: 1) old age, 2) survivors, 3) incapacity related, 4) health, 5) family, 6) 
active labor market programs, 7) unemployment, 8) housing, and 9) other 
social policy areas and include both cash and in-kind payments. Because this 
paper is focused on social policies for which the target group is the workforce, 
it uses the size of social policy payments made in only four of the nine 
categories (health, family, active labor market programs, and unemployment) 
as a percentage of GdP as a proxy variable for the degree of social policy 
development. Among the four areas targeting the workforce, spending on 
healthcare was the largest, and averaged from 2001 to 2005, Germany had 
the highest spending with 7.74% of GdP, while South Korea had the lowest 
spending with 2.84% of GdP. the five-year average for spending on family 
programs was highest in denmark at 3.38% of GdP, and South Korea was 
again the lowest at 0.14% of GdP.
conversely, in the policy areas of active labor market and unemployment, 
denmark had the largest amount of spending, whereas the united States and 
South Korea were lowest in the two categories, respectively. Although these 
measures are ratio variables, table 2 shows the country-by-country rank in 
spending as a percentage of GdP together with the Weibull plotting position 
calculated based on that ranking. In such a case, in a situation in which 
multivariate analysis is difficult, a non-parametric statistical method that 
uses an ordinal scale such as rankings may be more appropriate. Moreover, 
we may understand the aspects of social policy development using a plotting 
method that allows us to visualize immediately the sequenced variables 
alongside other variables.15
now, we examine the relationship between social policy preferences and 
the degree of social policy development. table 3 shows the result of examining 
the simple correlation between social policy preferences and skill specificity 
and the degree of social policy development. Here, social policy preferences 
15 Actually, in many comparative studies, comparative aspects are understood by 
plotting the relationship between target variables. This is used as empirical evidence 
for a theoretical discussion.
 comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy developments 165
and skill specificity are averaged for each country, and the degree of social 
policy development is measured by the total public social expenditure shown 
in table 2 above and the public social expenditure targeted toward the 
workforce.
The point we can confirm through table 3 is that the correlation between 
skill specificity and social policy preference is statistically significant,16 but 
on the other hand, the correlation between skill specificity and social policy 
development and the correlation between social policy preferences and social 
policy development is not only extremely weak, but it is also not statistically 
significant. What are the implications of this empirical evidence? It shows us 
16 The effect of skill specificity on social policy preference can also be confirmed through 
a multiple regression analysis. See the appendix.
Table 2. Social Policy Spending as a Percentage of GdP for the 16 oecd countries1














































































































































Source: oecd. 2010. Social expenditure database.
note: 1. Average public social expenditures as a percentage of GdP from 2001 to 2005.
    2.  The Weibull plotting position of an item with rank r in a list of n items is calcu-
lated as r/(n + 1).
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that attempts to establish a direct causal relationship between social policy 
preference and social policy development are not appropriate, as when one 
allows for the fact that social policy is produced according to a process of 
collective decision-making by all members of society, then of course social 
policy development will differ according to the concrete institutional form of 
that collective decision-making process.
Table 3. Simple correlation of Skill Specificity, Social Policy Preference, and Social Policy 
















Spending 13 0.1245 0.0350 1.0000
Social Policy 
Spending 24 0.1115 0.0861 0.9386* 1.0000
Social Policy 
Spending 35 0.1227 0.0871 0.9397* 0.9963* 1.0000
Social Policy 
Spending 46 0.1422 0.0799 0.9223* 0.9932* 0.9831*
* P < .1
note: 1. Average value of Specificity Index 3 for the country. data shown in table 1.
    2.  Average value of Social Policy Preference Index for programs targeting the work-
force in the country. data shown in table 1.
    3.  Average value of public social expenditures as a percentage of GdP from 2001-
2005, from table 2.
    4.  Average value of public social expenditures related to the workforce (healthcare, 
family, labor market, and unemployment) as a percentage of GdP from 2001-
2005, from table 2.
    5.  Average value of public social expenditures related to the workforce as a percent-
age of GdP in 2002 (data as in that of note 3).
    6.  Average value of public social expenditures related to the workforce as a percent-
age of GdP in 2005 (data as in that of note 3).
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2.  Comparing the Aspects of Political Systems: The Degree of 
Development of Democratic Politics and the Characteristics of 
Electoral Rules
In the theoretical model suggested above, political systems were categorized 
as committee systems, proportional election systems, and majoritarian 
election systems according to the degree of the development of democratic 
politics and the differences of electoral rules. Also, using a mathematical 
model, with all other factors being equal it predicted that the level of social 
policy development would be highest in the proportional election system, 
while it would be lowest in the committee system, in which democratic 
development is relatively slow. table 4 shows various measures on the degree 


































































































































note: 1.  each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of free-
dom. Averaging over 1991~2005. Freedom House (2010).
    2.  What degree the respondent would agree “MPs try to keep promises”. It start with 1-as 
strongly agree and end at 5 with strongly disagree. Shows the average value from each coun-
try from the ISSP survey data.
    3.  What degree the respondent would agree “politicians involved in corruption”. It start with 
1-as strongly agree and end at 5 with strongly disagree. Shows the average value from each 
country from the ISSP survey data.
    4.  Weibull plotting position using these 4 measures.
    5.  classification of electoral rules. Mr means majoritarian, Pr is proportional, and Mixed 
means mixed system. Interparliamentary union (2010).
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of development of democratic politics and the differences of electoral rules in 
the sixteen countries ecd.
First, the average of measurements taken from 1991 through 2005 
is shown, of the civil liberty index and political rights index is depicted, 
showing typical proxy variables expressing the degree of the development 
of democracy. This stems from the conclusion that it is more appropriate to 
understand the degree of the development of democracy from a medium-
term point of view than from one particular point in time.
next, the 2006 ISSP also contains two questions that are closely related 
to the development of political democracy. one question asks to what 
degree the respondent would agree “MPs try to keep promises”. the other 
asks to what degree the respondent would agree “politicians involved in 
corruption” These two variables are measured on individual level, so they can 
represent subjective evaluation of each country’s political democracy. There 
are several reasons for inserting these two variables into the proxy index 
expressing the degree of development of democratic political systems. First, 
since implementation of electoral promises are essential factors in collective 
decision-making based on the preferences of members of a society, collectively 
this is judged to be an important index for expressing the development 
of democratic political systems. Also, because the institutionalization of 
competitive elections according to the development of democratic political 
systems naturally minimizes the possibility that politicians (policy makers) 
will acquire illegal rent payments, the subjective assessments of members 
of a society of corruption by politicians are seen as an index of the degree 
of the development of the democratic political system in a given society. In 
table 4, the above four categories of variables are synthesized and ranked, 
and the Weibull plotting position calculated from these rankings is shown. If 
we examine the degree of development of democratic political systems based 
on the regional ranking, denmark is positioned at the highest rank, with the 
netherlands, new Zealand, and Switzerland coming next.
In the theoretical model suggested in this paper, the proportional 
system is described as a situation in which all of society consists of only 
one electoral district, whereas the majoritarian system is described as a 
single member electorate system in which one candidate is elected from 
each of many electoral districts. However, each country’s electoral rules are 
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extremely complicated and diverse; therefore, it is never easy to measure 
their characteristics with only a single tool. If we examine the related 
research, considering these limitations, it becomes clear that there are 
generally two methods used to classify electoral rules (Alesina, Glaeser, and 
Sacerote 2001). First, there is the method that uses information supplied by 
international organizations such as the IPu (Inter-Parliamentary union). 
IPu classifies a given country’s electoral rules as proportional, majoritarian, 
or a mixed system. this method has a problem in that it assigns a simple 
classification to complicated electoral rules, but has the advantage of 
including a comparatively high number of countries and of being intuitive. 
The other method measures the degree of proportionality using the sizes of 
the electoral districts and the electoral formula for choosing a winner. the 
greater this measure is, the more it resembles a proportional system. this 
method has a problem that it requires the collection of detailed information 
about each country’s election system; depending on the method used to 
compile the index, one country’s electoral rules may be classified differently. 
this paper uses information supplied by the Inter-Parliamentary union 
and classifies each country’s election regulations. However, in this case, the 
countries that have bicameral systems become problematics. If a country has 
majoritarian electoral rules for its lower house and proportional rules for its 
upper house, this introduces the question of how to classify it. this paper 
classifies such countries as having a mixed system. The results of classifying 
election systems using this method are shown in the last row of table 4. In 
the case of european countries, the united Kingdom is the only country 
with a majoritarian election system, while Germany, France, Ireland, and 
Switzerland operate with systems that are a combination of proportional 
and majoritarian. The other countries all have proportional election systems. 
conversely, among countries belonging to east Asia, north America, and 
oceania, none have adopted a proportional election system.
3. Overall Picture
In this section, we examine the overall picture, with social policy preferences, 
political systems, and the development of social policy all taken into account. 
First, we put the degree of the development of social policy and the degree 
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of the development of democratic political systems on the x and y axes, 
respectively. Figure 1 expresses the position of a given country based on the 
Weibull plotting position. Also, the countries belonging to a cluster resulting 
from the implementation of a hierarchical cluster analysis based on the skill 
specificity, social policy preference, and the development of democratic 
political systems as suggested above are grouped together in an ellipse.
let’s examine this concretely. the average value of skill specificity in 
Group 1, consisting of South Korea and Japan, at 0.3159, is not only higher 
than the average value for Group 2 at 0.3049 but also higher than that of 
Group 3 at 0.3128. Also, the average value of the preference for social policy 
in Group 1, at 4.42, is shown to be lower than the average value for Group 
3 at 4.49 but higher than that for Group 2, at 4.38. Finally, if we only look at 
preferences for social policy and the degree of skill specificity, then Group 1 
is comparable to Groups 2 and 3. However, Group 1, compared to Groups 2 
and 3, is relatively slow in terms of the development of democratic political 
systems and is also lower than the other groups in terms of the development 
of social policy programs taking the workforce as their target group. The type 
of comparative aspect shown in Figure 1 shows the possibility that the lack 
of the development of democratic political systems based on a foundation 
of collective decision-making through the preferences of members of a 
society is related to the phenomenon of the formation of a gap between the 
social policy preferences of members of society and the actual social policy 
development of that society.
on the other hand, in the case of Groups 2 and 3, the difference in the 
development of democratic political systems is not large, whereas there is 
a difference in the degree of the development of social policy programs. 
Group 2, which is composed of Australia, canada, Ireland, new Zealand, 
Switzerland, and the united States, has a difference in the degree of the 
development of social policy from that of Group 3, which is composed of 
denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the netherlands, norway, Sweden, 
and the united Kingdom. What is the difference between these two groups? 
First, the average value of skill specificity in Group 2 is 0.3049 and the 
average value of the degree of preference for social policy is 4.38, which are 
lower than the average value of skill specificity, 0.3128, and average value 
of the degree of preference for social policy, 4.49, in Group 3. considering 
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the fact that the degree of the development of democratic political systems 
is relatively high in Groups 2 and 3, the difference in the degrees of social 
policy development between the two groups can be seen as a reflection of the 
social policy preferences of the members of the society. However, there are 
many differences between the methods used in Groups 2 and 3 to gather the 
preferences of society members. This is a direct result of the fact that among 
the countries belonging to Group 2, there are none that have a proportional 
election system, whereas among the eight countries belonging to Group 
3, five have a proportional election system, and two more have a system 
note: 1.  countries shown to belong to the same cluster resulting from the cluster analysis 
are grouped in an ellipse.
    2.  The first numbers listed correspond to the group’s average skill specificity; num-
bers shown in square brackets [ ] correspond to the group’s average degree of so-
cial policy preference; numbers shown in brackets < > correspond to the group’s 
average electoral district magnitude.
    3.  district magnitude measure is computed as a weighted average of the various dis-
trict sizes. The larger the district magnitude, the greater the degree of proportion-
ality. See Johnson and Wallack (2007).
Figure 1. comparative Aspects of Preferences and Political System, and the development 
of Social Policy.
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combining proportional and majoritarian election systems.
For a clear understanding of this difference, we looked for the average 
value of the district magnitude, which is widely used as an index to measure 
the degree of the proportionality of the election system. The result is shown 
in that the average value of the proportionality of the countries belonging 
to Group 2 is 2.60 compared to that of the countries belonging to Group 3, 
at 17.45.17 remembering that a larger proportionality value denotes a closer 
type to the ideal of a proportional election system, this result means that 
Groups 2 and 3 can be distinguished by their respective majoritarian and 
proportional election systems. Finally, the comparative picture shown in 
Figure 1, that is, the picture that the degree of social policy development is 
expressed more highly in Group 3 than in Group 2, and in Group 2 than in 
Group 1, shows that differences in the degree of social policy development or 
differences in the welfare state arise according to differences in social policy 
preferences and in the political system when collectively assessing the social 
policy preferences of members of a society.
IV. concluSIon
this paper has attempted to demonstrate through a theoretical model and 
empirical data that there is a close relationship between the social policy 
preferences of members of a society and the political system used to gather 
those social policy preferences collectively and the development of social 
policy. The prediction of an asset theory of social policy is supported by the 
results of empirical research targeting western welfare states. this theory 
is receiving attention in that it explains the development of social policy, 
regional deviations in the development of such policies, the institutional 
complementarity of production regime and welfare regime, and other factors 
with a generalized causal model based on the rational preferences of members 
17 The large difference between the two clusters is due to the method of measuring the 
degree of proportionality. Supposing there were a total of 200 seats and a country had 
a completely proportional election system, then the index of proportionality would be 
200. conversely, if this country had a completely majoritarian election system, then 
the index of proportionality would be 0.995.
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of a society. nevertheless, South Korea and Japan, despite being classified 
as cMes and therefore having a comparatively high assessment of the skill 
specificity of the members of their societies, still lag behind compared to 
other countries in terms of the development of social policy. In other words, 
South Korea and Japan are considered outliers in asset theory, just as they are 
in most theories of social policy developed from western societies. However, 
there is no reason such examples must be considered as outliers exceeding 
the limits of application of a universal theory, or as special cases. In order for 
social policy preferences to guide the development of actual social policy, 
there is a necessary precondition that these preferences are fully reflected 
in the collective decision-making process. This precondition is true only in 
certain countries that have very developed democratic political systems. This 
is an extremely obvious point, but the application of labels such as “outlier” 
or “admixture” to east Asian welfare states such as South Korea and Japan is 
more of a problem with the theory applied than with the given example itself. 
this is evidence of the necessity of focusing on the effects of the concrete 
institutional form of the collective decision-making process on social policy 
decisions.
A detailed multivariate analysis was not possible due to limitations in the 
data, but as a result of examining patterns of co-variation observed between 
political systems and social policy development, we noted that there is a 
close relationship between the political system and the social policy. First, 
if we only look at the preference of social policy and skill specificity, Japan 
and South Korea are comparable to other countries classified as cMes. 
However, for Japan and South Korea, compared to other countries classified 
as either cMes or lMes, the degree of the development of democratic 
political systems is relatively low and the degree of the development of 
social policy programs targeting the workforce is also low. This comparative 
picture shows the possibility that this lag in the development of democratic 
political systems based on the collective decision-making of preferences of 
members of a society is related to the formation of a gap between the social 
policy preferences of members of a society and the actual development of 
social policy. on the other hand, between countries that have developed 
democratic political systems to some degree, there are differences to be found 
not only in the degree of social policy preferences by members of society or 
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skill specificity, but also in the aspects of their political system, that is, their 
electoral rules.
Finally, the comprehensive picture of the sixteen countries shows the 
existence of a close relationship between the social policy preferences of 
members of a society and the political system that collectively gathers these 
preferences, and the actual development of social policy. A political system 
creates a relationship—whether one of complementarity, discord, or outlier—
that exists between the social policy preferences of members of a society and 
the actual development of social policy. This illustrates the necessity of paying 
attention to the problem of the participation of members of a society in the 
collective decision-making process and of the problem of the normative 
framework of a constitution and the institutional framework of a political 
system to that democracy may be advanced.
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APPendIx
the effects of skill specificity on social policy preferences are analyzed 
through general olS regression model. However, because many different 
countries are included in the data analyzed, the possibility is high that the 
systematic characteristics of each country will have an effect on the estimation 
process of the regression coefficients. Therefore, the sixteen countries targeted 
by the analysis (Australia, canada, denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Japan, South Korea, the netherlands, new Zealand, norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the united Kingdom, and the united States) are inserted into 
the analytical model through country dummy variables. on the other hand, a 
variety of variables predicted to have an effect on the social policy preferences 
of members of a society must be inserted into the model as control variables. 
These are explained below:
1) Income: In the ISSP data, pretax income variable was collected through 
a self-reporting method. In a given country, pretax income was measured in 
ordered categories, but the ISSP offers measurements of the median value 
in a given category. on the other hand, all income is measured according 
to the country’s currency value. In this paper, these are converted into u.S. 
dollars according to purchasing power parity exchange rates at 2006 levels. 
depending on whether social policy is looked at as a means of redistribution 
or as a means of insurance, the effect of income on social policy preference 
can be different, but according to the asset model of social policy preferences 
presented in this paper, the higher the income level, the lower the preference 
for social policy.
2) Age: older members of a society will have a greater preference for 
social policy than younger members of society. As age increases, retirement 
draws closer. In addition it becomes more difficult to find a new job. In the 
ISSP data, age data is collected through self-reporting.
3) Gender: According to a number of arguments (orloff, 1993; Iversen and 
Soskice, 2001), in cases of equal status in the labor market, women will have a 
greater preference for the development of social policy than men. According 
to such arguments, it is predicted that women will show preferences for the 
development of social policy more than men.
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4) labor Market Status: this paper’s theoretical model starts from the 
assumption that individual positioning in the labor market is a major factor 
determining social policy preference. First, regular workers with a high 
degree of job security compared with those who do not have this security 
have less of a preference for the development of social policy as a mechanism 
for dispersing labor market risk. By the same token, the unemployed may 
have a greater preference for the development of social policy than those 
who are employed. The economically inactive population of people who are 
not engaged in economic activity is a very heterogeneous group consisting 
of people unable to work as well as those who cannot find jobs; thus, the 
direction of their social policy preferences cannot be easily predicted. 
However, it has been concluded that the necessity of including it as a control 
variable is great. In the ISSP data, labor market status is divided into ten 
categories, from regular employment to inability to work. This paper inserts 
as a dummy variable whether or not one is a regular employee, whether or 
not one is unemployed, and whether or not one belongs to the economically 
inactive population.
5) union Membership: According to theories of power resources 
(Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983), the social policy preferences of those belonging 
to unions or supporting left-wing political parties can be predicted to be 
higher. In the ISSP data, the union membership variable is measured by three 
categories: 1) union membership, 2) currently withdrawn, but having the 
experience of being a union member, and 3) not a union member. This paper 
creates two dummy variables as the categories of union membership and uses 
them.
6) Party Preference: As with the union membership variables, party 
preference is input as a control variable based on theories of power resources. 
In the ISSP data, the preferences of currently active political parties in the 
target country are normalized according to an ideological spectrum from 
left to right after they are gathered. through this method, the normalized 
party preferences are reclassified in this paper as follows: 1) left-wing party 
supporter, 2) moderate party supporter, 3) right-wing party supporter, or 4) 
independent/undecided. Furthermore, in the analysis, three dummy variables 
created for “left-wing party supporter” as a mood category are inserted.
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Here we examine the effects of skill specificity on social policy preferences 
through the results of a regression analysis into which the above variables 
were inserted. the results of the regression analysis of the three models 
distinguished according to the index's manner of measuring skill specificity 
Supplemental Table 1. characteristics of the Input Variables in the Analysis





Preference of social 
policy aimed at the 
workforce
Points for six items normalized to 1 
and combined
10,237 4.46 0.69
Specificity Index 1 (ratio of a given job/ratio of a given 
workforce)/Skill level
11,644 0.42 0.35
Specificity Index 2 (ratio of a given job/ratio of a given 
workforce)/education level
11,562 0.20 0.19
Specificity Index 3 The average of Index 1 and Index 2 11,562 0.31 0.26
Income Annual pre-tax income (in u.S. $) 11,644 33,759.7 27320.1
Age Age 11,644 46.14 15.42
Gender
   Men





   regular employment
   unemployed
   economically Inactive
regular employment = 1, not = 0
unemployed = 1, not = 0






   current member
   Has been a member
   never a member
currently a union member
Was a union member in the past, but 
not currently






   left-wing
   Moderate
   right-wing
   Independent/
   undecided
Supports extreme left or 
left-leaning party
Supports a moderate party
Supports extreme right or






Source: Same as table 1 in body text.
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are shown in table 2, while in table 1, the characteristics of the above 
variables inserted into the analysis of the effects of skill specificity on social 
policy preferences are shown.
Supplemental Table 2. effects of Skill Specificity on Social Policy Preference; regression 
Analysis of the 16 oecd countries
Preference of Social Policy targeting the Workforce1
Model 1    Model 2 Model 3
coefficient Se coefficient  Se coefficient Se
Specificity Index 1 .075** .020 -- -- --
Specificity Index 2 -- -- .154** .038 --
Specificity Index 3 -- -- -- .112** .027
Income -3.50e-06** 4.83e-07 -3.53e06** 4.82e-07 -3.49e-06** 4.82e-07
Age .033** .0005 .003** .0005 .003** .0005
Gender2 .068** .015 .069** .015 .071** .015
regular employment -.007 .021 -.005 .021 -.005 .021
unemployed .339** .044 .340** .044 .339** .044
economically Inactive .027 .024 .025 .024 .026 .024
Has been a union 
member3
-.016 .019 -.016 .019 -.016 .019
Has never been a 
union member3
-.086** .018 -.087** .018 -.086** .018
Moderate party sup-
porter4
-.256** .020 -.258** .020 -.258** .020
right-wing party sup-
porter4
-.415** .017 -.416** .017 -.416** .017
Independent or 
undecided4
-.163** .021 -.164** .021 -.163** .021
Sample Size 10,237 10,174 10,174
r2 0.20 0.20 0.20
F value 86.68** 86.28** 86.36**
** p < .001
Source: Same as table 1 of the body text.
note: 1.  The sixteen countries are inserted into the analysis as dummy variables (omitted in the 
table).
     2. The reference category is male.
     3. The reference category is union membership.
     4. The reference category is left-wing party supporter.
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table 2 shows that in all the models, the proxy variables measuring skill 
specificity have a statistically significant effect on social policy preferences. In 
other words, the higher a member of society’s skill specificity is, the higher 
his or her preference for social policy targeting the labor population will be. 
Given that the institutional differences between the sixteen oecd countries 
are controlled through dummy variables in the analytical model, these results 
show that social policy preferences are reasonable within the institutional 
constraints. In the analysis, the effects of the inserted control variables 
are consistent with the predictions. First, it is shown that the higher the 
member of society’s income level is, the less he/she will prefer social policy, 
which is consistent with the prediction of the asset model. It is shown that 
older members of a society will prefer social policy more and that women 
prefer social policy more than men. Additionally, the unemployed prefer 
social policy more than the employed. the analysis shows that the union 
membership and party preference variables inserted according to theories 
of power resources also have a statistically significant effect on social policy 
preferences. In other words, members of a society who have never been union 
members, compared to those who are currently union members, have a lower 
degree of preference for social policy. Also, members of a society who do not 
support left-wing political parties have lower social policy preferences than 
those who do support these parties.
